For reasons stated in this case in regions as complex as the Middle East, realists recommend extreme caution as to when and where a state uses its military might. It is easy, looking at realism, to dismiss it as a warmongering theory. For example, if you read the first half of the paragraph above, you might think that realism would support an attack on ISIS. But if you read the second half of the paragraph, you will notice that the same theory recommends extreme caution. 37 See, for example, Leiter, B., “American Legal Realism,” in Patterson, D. and Edmundson, W.A. (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, (2010) 50, 61Google Scholar (“Scholars at Yale (in particular Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal) proposed a watered-down version of realism under the slogan “political science.” Fortunately, “political science” is now gone, because it had much more to do with the rationalization of US imperialism than with science); O`Connell, M. E., “New International Legal Process,” (1999) 93 AJIL 334, 350CrossRefGoogle Scholar (The policies and standards of the New Haven School are those of its creators and were too closely aligned with U.S. interests to be the standards of the international community. Quote from A. Carty, The Decay of International Law? (1986)). It is utopian to ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely solely on power.
Thucydides seems to support neither the naïve idealism of the Melians nor the cynicism of their Athenian opponents. It teaches us to be wary of “naïve dreams in international politics” on the one hand and “the other pernicious extreme: unbridled cynicism” on the other (Donnelly 2000, 193). While he can be considered a political realist, his realism does not anticipate realpolitik, which denies traditional ethics, nor today`s scientific neorealism, in which moral issues are largely ignored. Thucydides` realism, neither immoral nor amoral, is more comparable to that of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and other classical realists of the twentieth century, who, while meeting the requirements of the national interest, would not deny that political actors on the international scene are subject to moral judgment. 45 hours. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1967), 87-8 (“A rule of law is valid even if it is not fully effective – it is sufficient if it is “largely effective”, that is, if it is applied and followed to some extent”); H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), 235 (“Rules of simple structure [international law], like the fundamental rule of the more advanced system, are binding if accepted and function as such”).
Hart discussed system-level validity for advanced legal systems, but noted that international law is analogous to the rules of a primitive society where there is no rule of recognition. Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism applied to national and international affairs. It is a doctrine that denies the relevance of morality in politics and claims that all means (moral and immoral) are justified to achieve certain political ends. Although Machiavelli never uses the term ragione di stato or its French equivalent, the raison d`être is what ultimately matters to him: everything that is good for the state, not scruples or ethical standards. Since it is impossible for the purposes of this article to present all the thinkers who contributed to the development of twentieth-century classical realism, E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, like perhaps the most influential among them, have been discussed here. To the extent that power or interest is defined as power, the concept that defines politics is politics is an autonomous sphere, as Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to ethics.
However, ethics still play a role in politics. “A man who was nothing more than a `politician` would be an animal, because he would completely lack moral constraints. A man who was nothing but a `moral man` would be a fool, for he would be completely inprudent” (12). Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power and morality, be taken into account. Realism is therefore more than a static and amoral theory and cannot be accommodated only in a positivist interpretation of international relations. It is a practical and evolving theory that depends on actual historical and political conditions and is ultimately judged by its ethical standards and relevance to prudent political decisions (Morgenthau 1962). Realism also plays a useful warning role. He warns us against progressivism, moralism, legalism, and other orientations that lose touch with the reality of self-interest and power. From this point of view, the neorealist revival of the 1970s can also be interpreted as a necessary corrective to an overly optimistic liberal belief in international cooperation and the change resulting from interdependence.
The first assumption of realism is that the nation-state (usually abbreviated to “state”) is the main actor in international relations. There are other bodies, such as individuals and organizations, but their power is limited. Second, the state is a unique actor. National interests, especially in times of war, mean that the state speaks and acts with one voice. Third, decision-makers are rational actors in the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the national interest. Here, it would not be rational to take measures that would make your state weak or vulnerable. Realism suggests that all leaders, regardless of their political persuasion, recognize this when trying to manage the affairs of their state in order to survive in a competitive environment. After all, States live in a context of anarchy, that is, in the absence of international leaders.
The oft-used analogy that, in an international emergency, “there is no one to call” underscores this point. In our own states, we usually have police forces, military forces, courts, etc. In the event of an emergency, these institutions are expected to “take action” in response. Internationally, there is no clear expectation that someone or anything will “do something” because there is no established hierarchy. Therefore, States can ultimately rely only on themselves. This chapter presents the realistic legal approach to international law. It consists of five parts. Part 1 provides a brief context of the emergence and fundamental attributes of legal realism, dividing legal realism into three interrelated dimensions – behavioral, critical and pragmatic – that explain the development and practice of law.